Florida State University College of Law

Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Publications
2017

Fisheries without Courts: How Fishery Management Reveals our
Dynamic Separation of Powers
Erin Ryan

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Erin Ryan, Fisheries without Courts: How Fishery Management Reveals our Dynamic Separation of
Powers, 32 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 430 (2017),
Available at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/709

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

FISHERIES WITHOUT COURTS:
HOW FISHERY MANAGEMENT REVEALS
OUR DYNAMIC SEPARATION OF POWERS
ERIN RYAN*
I.
II.
III.

IV.
V.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 431
WHY IS FISHERIES MANAGEMENT SO ADMINISTRATIVE? .. 433
A. The Paradox of Fisheries Management ....................... 433
B. Fisheries and the Administrative State ....................... 437
WHY ARE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLANS THE MOST
FREQUENT TARGETS OF SUIT? ............................................ 440
A. The FCMA National Standards .................................. 441
B. Fishery Management Plans as Litigation Bait?.......... 445
WHY DOES INDUSTRY BRING LITIGATION MORE
OFTEN THAN ENVIRONMENTALISTS? ................................. 447
A. Public Choice Theory and Fishing Litigation. ............ 448
CONCLUSION: FISHERIES AND OUR DYNAMIC
SEPARATION OF POWERS..................................................... 450
I. INTRODUCTION

This essay adds a perspective from fisheries governance to
the broader inquiry into the respective roles of judicial, legislative,
and executive decision-making in modern environmental law. It
comments on Robin Craig and Catherine Danley’s quantitative
assessment of litigation under the federal Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (FCMA),1 which concludes, among other things,
that the FCMA has generally prompted less judicial intervention
than other environmental laws.2 Craig and Danley have contributed
*
Elizabeth C. & Clyde W. Atkinson Professor, Florida State University College
of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.A., Wesleyan University; B.A., Harvard University.
This essay was prepared for Environmental Law Without Courts, the second in a series of
symposia exploring the evolving separation of powers dynamics within environmental law.
I am especially grateful to Josh Eagle for his comments, research, and recommendations in
support of this analysis. I am also thankful to Robin Craig for prompting the piece, to Donna
Christie for her insights, to Jim Salzman for introducing me to the science of fishery management, and to Barbara Kaplan for her generous research support.
1. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, Pub. L. 94-265,
90 Stat. 331 (1976), and Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007) [hereinafter collectively
FCMA] (each codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
2. Robin K. Craig & Catherine Danley, Federal Fisheries Management: A Quantitative
Assessment of Federal Fisheries Litigation Since 1978, 32 J. OF LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
381 (2017). While fisheries management has not always been viewed within the ambit of
environmental law, Congress has increasingly required it to contend with issues of scarcity,
sustainability, biodiversity, and habitat protection that are conventionally associated
with environmental regulation.
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a valuable data set about federal fisheries litigation, one that invites
further analysis of their findings and the implications of these findings for the horizontal separation of powers in environmental law.
This essay takes up that invitation to consider three key questions raised by their research: (1) Why is the judicial role in fisheries
management small in comparison to the executive role? (2) When
litigation is brought, why are fishery management plans the most
frequent targets of litigation? And finally, (3) why is it that even
with so many fisheries in decline, members of the fishing industry
bring litigation more often than environmentalists?
I begin with a quick foray into fisheries science and economics to
establish the fundamental paradox of fisheries management, in
which fishery managers strive to set a sustainable yield of extraction that accounts for the various ways that extraction can itself
alter the resource, requiring successively recursive rounds of regulatory adjustment. This analysis reveals why fisheries management
is ideally suited to the features of administrative governance, in contrast to the comparative advantages of legislative or judicial oversight, because executive branch actors can generally respond more
rapidly and adaptively to a fluid stream of highly technical data.
Nevertheless, when FCMA litigation does arise, fishery management plans become the most frequent targets of suit because the
legislature has statutorily deferred unresolved policy clashes to
the executive branch—presumably because executive actors are
best positioned to resolve them in distinctive regional fisheries, and
in consultation with relevant local stakeholders. When this litigation does arise, public choice theory helps explain why professional
fishers3 routinely outpace environmentalists to the courtroom, even
though long-term conservation interests are often more imperiled
than the short-term economic interests usually championed by
industry participants.
Despite these predictable problems, I conclude that administrative fisheries management is probably still our best bet, even if
certain aspects of the FCMA could bear improvement, including
improved stakeholder representation for conservation interests.4
3. In this piece, I use the term “fishers” to advance the goal of using gender-neutral
language in academic literature whenever possible. But I also acknowledge the complexity of
the choice, knowing that many female captains prefer to be called “fishermen,” which they
see as a gender-neutral term.
4. Scholars and advocates have suggested alternative configurations of administrative
fisheries management, some of which warrant consideration. See, e.g., Josh Eagle & Amanda
Kuker, Public Fisheries, 15(1) ECOLOGY & SOCETY 10 (2010) [hereinafter Eagle & Kuker,
Public Fisheries] (proposing a move away from the “neo-Pinchotian” approach taken by the
FCMA and toward a new model of public ownership); Josh Eagle, James N. Sanchirico &
Barton H. Thompson Jr., Ocean Zoning and Spatial Access Privileges: Rewriting the Tragedy
of the Regulated Ocean, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 646 (2008) [hereinafter Eagle, Sanchirico &
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Indeed, Craig and Danley’s research reveals changing litigation
trends after the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 19965 and the Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act of 20066 that demonstrate
the dynamic interplay between all three branches of government in
fisheries management. Hopefully, this pattern of engagement will
remain vital in fisheries management—and ideally, wider environmental law—appropriately erring on the side of administrative
process while maintaining a healthy horizontal balance of power.
II. WHY IS FISHERIES MANAGEMENT SO ADMINISTRATIVE?
I begin with the broadest question at issue: why is it that
fisheries management is so heavily administrative in nature? As
Craig and Danley describe it, U.S. fishery governance has been
structured to operate primarily through executive oversight, with
broad legislative commands and minimal judicial intervention.7
The principal U.S. law governing fisheries, the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA),8 has been
characterized by its own administrators as “designed to encourage
user-group self-regulation within legislatively prescribed scientific
and policy-based parameters.”9 Craig and Danley’s research
confirms that most of the work takes place in neither the halls of
Congress nor the courtroom, but within the complex machinery of
the administrative state. Yet why is this so?
A. The Paradox of Fisheries Management
To demonstrate why fisheries management is uncommonly
suited for executive oversight, a brief overview of fisheries science
may help.10 Our exposition begins with a critical baseline assumption that fishery managers use in doing their job: the “carrying
Thompson, Ocean Zoning] (advocating an “ocean zoning” model of fisheries management more
akin to public lands management).
5. Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996) (codified at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1803, 1861, 1881–1883, 5107a, 5107b (2012)).
6. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act
of 2006, Pub. L. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007).
7. Craig & Danley, supra note 1, at 381 (“Unlike many federal environmental and natural resources laws, Congress actually designed federal fisheries management under the
Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act[] to operate as environmental law without the courts.”).
8. Supra note 2.
9. Craig & Danley, supra note 1, at 382 (quoting Marian Macpherson & Mariam
McCall, Judicial Remedies in Fisheries Litigation: Pros, Cons, and Prestidigitation?, 9 OCEAN
& COASTAL L.J. 1, 4 (2003)).
10. See JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW AND POLICY, 457–61 (2d ed. 2009) (providing an excellent primer on fisheries science,
from which the present description is partially based).

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2970532
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2970532

434

JOURNAL OF LAND USE

[Vol. 32:2

capacity” of a fishery habitat, which describes the natural equilibrium level of a species within a habitat.11 Whenever key environmental factors are kept constant in a given habitat, that habitat
will support a constant biomass of a given fish population.12
While this premise works in theory, it can be hard to show
in practice, because key environmental factors are almost never
constant—especially in this age of climate instability.13 Nevertheless, the carrying capacity concept is important because it reveals a
curious paradox in the task of fisheries management, dealing with
how fishing itself changes the fishery resource in ways that require
management consideration.
It is probably obvious why too much fishing can damage the
resource. By depleting a population of fish at a rate that exceeds
that species’ ability to reproduce, overfishing can cause the entire
fishery to collapse.14 However, at least from the perspective of the
fishing industry, a certain level of fishing can actually make the
resource even more useful.15 In contrast to other natural resources,
where extraction only depletes the resource (such as mining), it
turns out that fish extraction can actually improve the fishery, at
least from an economic perspective.16 The reason has to do with the
different rates at which distinctive fish population structures are
able to replenish to their carrying capacity within the constraints of
a given habitat.
In an environment where there is no fishing (and absent other
natural disturbances), a fish population will be characterized as a
low productivity system in which large adults outcompete smaller
juveniles for scarce food and habitat resources.17 Older fish grow
more slowly, and though they can produce more eggs than younger

11. K. Blackhart, D.G. Stanton & A.M. Shimada, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F/SPO-69, NOAA FISHERIES GLOSSARY 5 (rev. ed.
June 2006), https://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st4/documents/FishGlossary.pdf [hereinafter
NMFS-F/SPO-69] (defining “carrying capacity” as “[t]he maximum population of a species
that an area or specific ecosystem can support indefinitely without deterioration of the
character and quality of the resource” and “[t]he level of use, at a given level of management,
at which a natural or man-made resource can sustain itself over a long period of time.”).
12. See id.
13. Sarah M. Kutil, Scientific Certainty Thresholds in Fisheries Management: A
Response to Changing Climate, 41 ENVTL. L. 233, 265–66 (2011); Diana L. Stram & Diana
C.K. Evans, Fishery Management Response to Climate Change in the North Pacific, 66 J. OF
MARINE SCI. 1633, 1636–37 (2009) (on climate change and fishery impacts).
14. PAMELA B. BAKER, FELIX G. COX & PETER M. EMERSON, MANAGING THE GULF
OF MEXICO COMMERCIAL RED SNAPPER FISHERY (1998).
15. Id.
16. From an ecological perspective, extraction simply removes otherwise available
biomass from the food web.
17. THEODORE PANAYOTOU, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS
FOR SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS, FAO Fisheries Tech. Paper
No. 228, FIPP/T228 (En), § 2 (1982).
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fish,18 their use of existing resources limits the ability of juvenile
fish to grow and reach reproductive age. Yet when fishing is
introduced into the system, many of those large adults will be
harvested. The removal of those large adults creates space for more
juveniles to thrive, and all else equal, those juveniles will survive
and grow more quickly than the older fish removed from the fishery.
In this way, fishing alters the average age and size structure of
the population to create a more dynamic, high productivity system
yielding greater economic returns for fishers.19 The fished system
will have the same carrying capacity as the un-fished system—
the same total biomass of fish in each environment—but the population that is being fished can replenish itself to carrying capacity
faster, because its members are growing more quickly. That means
that, at least in theory (and accounting for egg production rates
among larger and smaller fish), you can take a steadier stream
of fish out of the ecosystem and into the marketplace without
spiraling the entire system into overfishing decline. (Good fishery
management must also ensure that fishing technology and other
aspects of the fishing activity does not itself damage the ecosystem—a separate but equally important concern.20)
All of this leads to the great puzzle for fisheries management.
Too much fishing is clearly a bad thing, as it prevents the renewal
of the resource by interfering with reproduction. But perhaps
surprisingly, too little fishing can actually leave “value on the
table” economically, by facilitating the establishment of an economically suboptimal equilibrium. For this reason, a primary goal
of fisheries management is to identify something of a sweet spot—
the Goldilocks Level that allows neither too much nor too little fishing. Fishery managers call this magical sweet spot the “maximum
sustainable yield,” or “MSY.”21
The MSY represents the ideal level of extraction in a fishery—
the point at which managers are not allowing the kind of overfishing
that causes populations to plummet toward fishery collapse, but
neither are they leaving economic value on the table, by maintaining just enough fishing to enable the industry to reap the rewards

18. Mark A. Hixon, Darren W. Johnson & Susan M. Sogard, BOFFFFs: On the
Importance of Conserving Old-Growth Age Structure in Fishery Populations, 71 J. OF MARINE
SCI. 2171, 2172 (2014) (newer fisheries management science recognizes this reason to protect
some of the largest adults).
19. Id.; See also RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 10, at 458.
20. See, e.g., Simon Jennings & Michael .J. Kaiser, The Effects of Fishing on Marine
Ecosystems, 34 ADVANCES IN MARINE BIO. 201 (1988).
21. NMFS-F/SPO-69, supra note 11, at 28.
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of a high productivity system.22 It is the maximum amount of fish
that can be taken out of the fishery without sacrificing either the
biological sustainability or the economic efficiency of the system.23
The challenge, of course, is that managers need a lot of information to plot this curve accurately, and that information is not
always easily forthcoming. To set an accurate MSY, one needs to
know a fair amount about both the targeted species of fish and the
nature of the fishing operation. For example, to be able to forecast
the rates of growth and reproduction of the target species, you need
to know that species growth rate, fecundity, age at first spawning,
ratio of males to females, growth rate, migratory habits, natural
mortality, and so on.24 You also need to know how much of these
fish are being caught by fishers and how much effort it took to catch
them, the ratio of males to females in the catch, the value of different size fish in the marketplace, and so on.25 Some of this information is available from scientific research, but fishery managers
also rely heavily on landings data, based on the catch that fishers
bring back to shore.26
This raises yet another problem for fisheries management—
the dilemma of properly sequencing data and decision-making
in time—which James Rasband, James Salzman, and Mark
Squillace have explained in their useful treatment of fisheries
management.27 In a representative graph (see Figure 1) of fish stock
versus fish catch over time, the Y-axis plots biomass and
the X-axis plots time going forward. Read from the left, the first
line is a population curve, representing the number of fish (in an
overfished population) that are actually in the sea over the given
span of time. The second curve describes catch biomass, as reported
in landings data.

22. The MSY describes an ideal level of extraction within the traditional school of
fisheries management, but this school has been critiqued for failing to account for all connections between a given fish population and the ocean ecosystem within which it is embedded.
Important harms to the marine environment can be caused by fishing even when a fishery
is perfectly managed for MSY. See Jennings & Kaiser, supra note 20.
23. From the economic perspective, it is worth noting that the MSY describes a
productivity maximum, and not necessarily the economically optimal extraction point for
any particular fishing interest. That would require additional information about the costs of
the fishing activity itself, and it might represent a different point on the yield curve.
24. Richard K. Wallace & Kristen M. Fletcher, Understanding Fisheries Management
6–7 (2d ed. 2001). See also RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 10, at 460.
25. See RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 10, at 458.
26. See, e.g., Commercial Fisheries Statistics, NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV.,
https://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/commercial-fisheries/index (“Commercial Landings” section;
last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
27. See RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 10, at 462.
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Figure 1: Fish Stock vs. Fish Catch Over Time

As these authors have explained, the two lines reveal parallel
curves, but curves that are displaced in time—because, at least for
a period of time, fishers chasing a declining catch can sustain and
even increase their yield with more powerful fishing technology.
Eventually, the catch will reveal the declining population, but not
necessarily in time for management decisions to adapt to the crisis.
There may be an interim, depicted here as the space between the
first two vertical markers, in which fishers are able to continue
harvesting more fish with more effective fishing gear (gear that
improves the ratio of catch to each unit of expended effort by the
fisher), even after the initial decline in overall population begins.28
Nevertheless, even better fishing technology cannot conjure
more actual fish, and so the decline in population will eventually be
reflected in a reduced catch. Shown here to the right of the second
vertical marker, landings data will ultimately reflect the decline
beneath the waves, but substantially after that decline first begins,
and well into the downward spiral of the population. As the graph
reveals, when a fishery begins to collapse, there may be a devastating period during which landings data will falsely suggest that fish
stocks are increasing, even as they are actually decreasing.29 Which
means that, once a fishery is in collapse, we often do not even find
out about it until the decline is fairly serious. And by then, fishery
managers have to respond very quickly to have any hope of meaningful impact.
B. Fisheries and the Administrative State
This brings us squarely back to the question with which we
began, revealing why fisheries management is overwhelmingly the
work of the administrative state. Fisheries management is largely
the province of the executive branch because—as the foregoing
28. Id.
29. Id.
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discussion of fisheries science and economics demonstrates—it is an
exquisitely technical, data-driven, fluid, and adaptive project, often
requiring fast action and changes in course.
Indeed, day-to-day fishery management presents the paragon
example of the kind of science-based, wonky administrative governance that is appropriately delegated to subject matter experts, and
to operate with minimal judicial intervention. It is hard enough that
the resource continually shifts as key environmental factors in
the habitat change the carrying capacity. In addition, the fishing
activity itself changes the resource, and management choices can
dramatically change the resource as well, in ways that can occasionally confound expectations. While many natural resources respond
to management recursively this way, few do so as quickly as fisheries can, as unforgivingly, or in ways that are as patently difficult to
measure.
Good fishery management must therefore adapt continually
along multiple dimensions of variability and self-referential change,
ideally on an ongoing basis. It is the fluidity and adaptive qualities
of fisheries management that makes the minutiae so ill-suited for
decision making by, for example, the judiciary—which, among other
problems, simply takes too long. The critical data for decisionmaking will often be stale by the time a court can even get to it. To
be sure, judges help interpret important statutory directives with
big-picture implications for fisheries management—for example,
what Congress meant by “overfishing” when it directed agencies to
prevent it in on U.S. waters.30 However, the more tedious decisions
required by fishery management tend not to raise the questions of
linguistic interpretation, legislative intent, and retrospective factfinding that the judiciary is best equipped to answer. Moreover, the
feedback loop that arises between management choices, changes to
the resource, and resulting new management choices does not make
for a great legal precedent.
The same features make day-to-day fishery management a bad
candidate for the legislative process, which can take even longer
than the judiciary.31 Most legislators are not in a strong position to
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (as amended; effective Jan. 12, 2007). Of note, interpretation
of words like “overfishing” drive the outcome of most FCMA litigation, but the Chevron
doctrine of administrative law (directing courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations)
poses an important disincentive for would-be judicial challenges to fishery management
choices. See JOSH EAGLE, SARAH NEWKIRK & BARTON H. THOMPSON JR., TAKING STOCK OF
THE REGIONAL FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCILS (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2003) (noting that
judicial deference is a major deterrent to litigation, because courts are reluctant to overturn
agency decisions of a technical nature, such as the suitable definition of “overfished”).
31. But see Eagle, Sanchirico & Thompson, Ocean Zoning, supra note 4 (proposing
congressional fisheries management by legislative ocean zoning, following a land use
planning model, in which regional councils set the MSY for more limited areas while other
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evaluate the sophisticated scientific and economic data that inform
fishery management decisions at the front end, and they usually
lack the necessary time or resources to manage the ongoing data
inputs and stakeholder correspondence required for fishery management decisions going forward. By sheer economy of scale, legislatures are outmatched by the continuous and intricate demands of
good fisheries management.32
In contrast, administrative agencies can be designed and staffed
to accommodate scientific complexity and ongoing stakeholder
input. Administrative collaboration with stakeholders is important,
not only as good agents of accountable governance, but because
stakeholders have access to much of the critical landings data that
fisheries management needs to work well.
Moreover, agency process can facilitate the kinds of cross-jurisdictional decision-making that fisheries management demands,
because water resources, and the marine life within them, are
notoriously bad at respecting arbitrary political boundaries.33 The
complexities of fisheries management often exceed the jurisdiction
of a single state, let alone a single national entity.34
Executive agencies are also well-positioned to coordinate across
the vertical separation of powers, facilitating the kinds of interjurisdictional management efforts that are often necessary within our
federal system of government. Too many spill-over impacts often
prevent resource management on a purely local level, but too many
local factors go into setting the MSY—from local ecosystem factors
to local market dynamics—for uniform decision-making at the
national level.35 And while Congress’s ability to negotiate with
state agencies in pursuit of federal policies is constitutionally
constrained,36 federal agencies have a wider array of tools and

ocean zones are designated for other management strategies, such as recreation and conservation).
32. Of interest, the California legislature performed the task of setting fishing quotas
through the 1950s, but legislative management responsibility was eventually ceded to
the administrative state there as well. See generally ARTHUR MCEVOY, THE FISHERMAN’S
PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND THE LAW IN CALIFORNIA, 1850-1980 (1990).
33. ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN, 151–53 (2012) [hereinafter
RYAN, TUG OF WAR WITHIN] (discussing the jurisdictional challenge of managing water
resources).
34. The international dimensions of this problem are addressed by the U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea, Part V (detailing the rights of nations to fish within designated
Exclusive Economic Zones) and Part VII (setting rights to fish in the High Seas).
35. Cf. RYAN, TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 33 (discussing the general challenges of
regulating within the inter-jurisdictional gray area).
36. See Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law After Sebelius,
85 COLO. L. REV. 1003 (2014) [hereinafter Ryan, Spending Power] (discussing spending power
bargaining as Congress’s primary means of negotiating with states for access to policymaking
influence beyond enumerated federal powers); see also Erin Ryan, Environmental Federalism’s Tug of War Within, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A
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methods for conducting interagency negotiations and cross-jurisdictional collaboration in pursuit of shared sustainability objectives.37
For these reasons, fisheries management provides a classic
example of the highly technical brand of policy implementation that
lawmakers delegate, within broad policy outlines (and usually with
great relief), to the care of the experts in the appropriate agency.
Accordingly, Congress has delegated fisheries management to the
executive branch through the FCMA, which provides broad guidance for agency decision-making while preserving generous space
for executive improvisation in the pursuit of sustainable fisheries.38
III. WHY ARE FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLANS
THE MOST FREQUENT TARGETS OF SUIT?
Congress thus sets overarching goals and basic procedures for
fishery management in the FCMA, but the Act gives wide latitude
to administrative agencies to craft management plans that will
protect individual fisheries, and to cope with the ongoing decisions
and stake-holder engagement required to keep these fisheries
healthy. The statute divides U.S. waters into eight regional fisheries
and requires the development of an individual Fishery Management
Plan (FMP) for each one.39 It entrusts design of the FMPs and annual specifications to eight regional Fishery Management Councils,
statutorily required to include representatives from all sectors of the
fishing industry, various state and federal agencies with interests
in fisheries, and other state-appointed officials with expertise in
fishery resources and fishing communities.40
Which leads us to the second part of our inquiry: when fishery
management does end up in court, why are these carefully-crafted,
locally-driven, stakeholder-informed management plans the most
frequent target of suit? It is a legitimate question, because most of
the stakeholders that litigate them are, by statutory design, part of
the drafting process. One might assume that the final output would
reflect their interests—and at least ideally, those interests should
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Kalyani Robbins, ed., 2015) [hereinafter Ryan, Environmental Federalism] (discussing the different mechanisms of cooperative environmental federalism).
37. Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV 1, 102–35 (2011) [hereinafter
Ryan, Negotiating Federalism] (discussing the advantages of executive process in the
negotiation of cross-jurisdictional policy-making and implementation).
38. FCMA § 301, 16 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012). As described below in Part III, the FCMA
requires the agency to appoint regional councils to assist them in decision making, and these
councils are composed of many members who are not employees of the executive branch
agency. Id. § 302(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b). In this regard, the FCMA process departs from the
usual model of executive branch administration. However, agency officials participate on the
regional councils and must approve their proposals to give them the force of law.
39. Id. § 302(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a).
40. Id. § 302(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b).
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align well with the goals of the FCMA, because the interests of fishers, fishing communities, and conservationists are all served by a
sustainable fishery, and all are undermined by fishery collapse.
Tragic examples of fishery collapse put pressure on this assumption, and stakeholder policy positions often diverge.41 But if everyone shares the same ultimate goal, why do FMPs end up in court?42
And if FMPs consistently provoke legal challenge, does this signify
a failure in the underlying statute? Does it signify a failure of
administrative fisheries governance?
A. The FCMA National Standards
To understand why fishery management plans become the most
frequent subject of litigation, we must consider the role they play
within the overall statutory system, beginning with underlying
policy guidance in the statute. As noted, Congress delegates the
day-to-day management of fishery resources to the regional councils
through the FCMA, which sets forth the structures and procedures
for agency decision-making while allowing generous latitude to
agency discretion in making these decisions. The statute essentially
commits the details of the management plans to agency discretion,43
but it does require that all plans advance a series of overarching
policy goals, set forth as the ten “National [S]tandards.”44
As Craig and Danley’s article describes, seven of these were
introduced in the original statute in 1976, and then the 1996
Sustainable Fisheries Act amendments added three more, designed
to address growing concerns about ongoing overfishing in spite of
the original FCMA’s constraints.45 Each standard states a discrete
policy goal for fisheries management, and all management plans
must be consistent with each of them. At first blush, this would not
seem to pose a problem, because each of the National Standards sets
forth an eminently reasonable, seemingly uncontroversial goal:
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the

41. Donna R. Christie, Living Marine Resources Management: A Proposal for
Integration of United States Management Regimes, 34 ENVTL. L. 107, 153 (2004) (noting
that while these interests should align, fishers’ choices to avoid short-term economic
pain often prevails over long-term choices that would sustain fishery over time).
42. For an interesting take on why stakeholders are always and inevitably
unhappy with fisheries management, see Eagle & Kuker, Public Fisheries, supra note 4.
43. FCMA § 301, 16 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012).
44. Id. (requiring that all FMPs be consistent with these conservation and management
measures).
45. Craig & Danley, supra note 1, at 381.
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optimum yield from each fishery for the United States
fishing industry.
(2) Conservation and management measures shall be
based upon the best scientific information available.
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish
shall be managed as a unit throughout its range, and
interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in
close coordination.
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not
discriminate between residents of different States. If it
becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges
among various United States fishermen, such allocation
shall be (A) fair and equitable to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; and (C) carried
out in such manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of such
privileges.
(5) Conservation and management measures shall,
where practicable, consider efficiency in the utilization of
fishery resources; except that no such measure shall have
economic allocation as its sole purpose.
(6) Conservation and management measures shall
take into account and allow for variations among, and contingencies in, fisheries, fishery resources, and catches.
(7) Conservation and management measures shall,
where practicable, minimize costs and avoid unnecessary
duplication.
(8) Conservation and management measures shall,
consistent with the conservation requirements of this chapter (including the prevention of overfishing and rebuilding
of overfished stocks), take into account the importance
of fishery resources to fishing communities by utilizing
economic and social data that meet the requirements of paragraph (2), in order to (A) provide for the sustained participation of such communities, and (B) to the extent practicable,
minimize adverse economic impacts on such communities.
(9) Conservation and management measures shall,
to the extent practicable, (A) minimize bycatch and (B) to
the extent bycatch cannot be avoided, minimize the mortality
of such bycatch.
(10) Conservation and management measures shall,
to the extent practicable, promote the safety of human life at
sea. 46
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1)–(10) (as amended; effective Jan. 12, 2007).
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The 1996 amendments further required that FMPs rebuild overfished stocks, identify essential fish habitat, minimize the adverse
effects on fish habitat by the fishing activity, and otherwise encourage habitat conservation.47 For the first time, they required that
FMPs specify objective and measurable criteria for identifying
fisheries approaching “overfished” status and standardized reporting methodology for assessing bycatch and conservation measures.48
Any harvest restrictions were required to be allocated equitably
among all sectors of the fishing industry.49 Finally, the Secretary of
the Department of Commerce was required to keep track of whether
fish sticks are overfished, and to assume control over management
decisions from any of the regional councils if the council did not
address the problem within specified time limits.50
Grossly oversimplified, then, FMPs should do the following
things: first and foremost, they should prevent overfishing. Also,
they should be based on good scientific information. They should
manage stocks as a unit, allocate fishing privileges fairly, and consider efficiency. They should take account of variations, seek to
minimize costs, and minimize adverse economic impacts wherever
possible. They should also minimize bycatch, and they should
promote the safety of life at sea. They should protect fish habitat
and distribute the economic benefits and burdens of management
choices equitably among the fishing industry. A management plan
that honors each concern should pass statutory muster, and one
that does not will fall short.
To be sure, each of these goals, on its own, seems like an excellent idea—but as with most multifactor mandates, honoring them
all simultaneously can create challenges in execution, due to some
unavoidably mixed messages among them.51 For example, consider
the potential conflicts between National Standard 1, which requires
managers to prevent overfishing while achieving the optimum
yield,52 and National Standard 8, which requires them to avoid
causing economic harm to fishing communities.53 In the long term,
of course, there should be no conflict, because fishing communities
will not do well economically after the local fishery collapses.
47. Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. 104-297, at §§ 106(b), 108(a)(1), 108(a)(3), 110
Stat. 3559 (1996) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1803, 1861, 1881–1883, 5107a, 5107b (2012)).
48. Id. § 108(a)(7).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 109(e).
51. See Josh Eagle, Domestic Fishery Management, in OCEAN & COASTAL LAW DESK
BOOK (Don Baur et al. eds. 2008) (“While the language of particular provisions is clear, the
statute as a whole delivers a mixed message.”)
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2012).
53. Id. § 1851(a)(8).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2970532

444

JOURNAL OF LAND USE

[Vol. 32:2

However, in the short run, limiting catch in the moment to protect
fish stocks in the future can create deep tension among stakeholders—tension that can provoke litigation—especially among fishers
facing a mortgage deadline next month.
In fact, FMPs have been challenged on this very point, as
advocates on each side of the issue claim that the standards support
their own preferred balancing point.54 The Sustainable Fisheries
Amendments of 199655 strongly suggest that the conservation
mandate at the heart of National Standard 1 should not be overcome
by other factors, and the courts have generally followed this lead—
but managers, litigants, and judges continue to struggle with the
proper balance between them.56
The important point here is that Congress did not really answer
these questions. Congress accurately identified some important
policy trade-offs that would eventually have to be made, but it
stopped short of doing so in the statute. Instead, Congress punted
the issue to the regional councils. Through the FCMA, Congress has
essentially handed over the big, unresolved policy questions about
54. Compare N.C. Fisheries Ass’n v. Daley, 16 F. Supp. 2d 647, 654 (E.D. Va. 1997)
(rejecting a management plan for failing to give due credence to the goals of National
Standard 8) with Lovgren v. Locke, 701 F.3d 5, 35 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The plain language of
[National Standard] 8 and its advisory guidelines make clear that these obligations are
subordinate to the MSA’s overarching conservation goals.”); see also N.C. Fisheries Ass’n v.
Daley, 27 F Supp. 2d 650, 662 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding that the agency had “abdicated [its]
responsibilities” with regard to National Standard 8 in service of competing conservation
interests); S. Offshore Fishing Assn. v. Daley, 995 F. Supp. 2d 1411 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (holding
that the agency’s inadequate economic impact analysis violated National Standard 8);
but see Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that
conservation interests must prevail over economic interests).
55. Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996) (codified at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1803, 1861, 1881–1883, 5107a, 5107b (2012)).
56. Compare the decision of the district court in Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley,
62 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 1999) (upholding the agency’s decision to prioritize the economic
interests protected by National Standard 8 over the conservation interests protected by
National Standard 1) with the Circuit Court’s decision overturning it, NRDC v. Daley,
209 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In the latter decision, the court emphasized that conservation
trumps:
[W]e reject the District Court’s suggestion that there is a conflict between the
Fishery Act’s expressed commitments to conservation and to mitigating adverse
economic impacts. . . . The Government concedes, and we agree, that, under the
Fishery Act, the Service must give priority to conservation measures. It is only when
two different plans achieve similar conservation measures that the Service takes
into consideration adverse economic consequences. This is confirmed both by the
statute's plain language and the regulations issued pursuant to the statute. See [16
U.S.C. § 1851(a)(8) (1994)] (requiring fishery management plans, “consistent with
the conservation requirements of this chapter,” to take into account the effect
of management plans on fishing communities) (emphasis added); 50 C.F.R.
§ 600.345(b)(1) (1999) (“[W]here two alternatives achieve similar conservation goals,
the alternative that . . . minimizes the adverse impacts on [fishing] communities
would be the preferred alternative.”) (emphasis added).
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d at 753.
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how to balance the conflicting goals of fisheries management to
administrative oversight, by incorporating a long list of idealistic
management goals with patently unresolved conflicts among them.
By giving the agency a long list of important but incommensurable
targets, Congress asks the Executive to become responsible for the
core policy choices involved in sorting them out in each instance57—
not unlike many other legislative delegations to the administrative
state.
B. Fishery Management Plans as Litigation Bait?
Which brings us back to our second inquiry: why are fishery
management plans so frequently the target of FCMA litigation?
And the answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, is exactly this reason: it is
because Congress has punted the big, unresolved policy questions
for administrative resolution in each individual management plan.
We have already discussed the tension between avoiding environmental and economic harm raised by National Standards 1 and
8, but the list reveals other conflicts as well. National Standard 7
requires that management plans minimize costs,58 but National
Standard 9 requires plans to also minimize bycatch.59 Like National
Standards 1 and 8, these are both laudable goals independently, but
they can point in opposite directions, as confirmed by subsequent
litigation.60 Indeed, the problem was even recognized by the House
Committee on Natural Resources when it proposed the Sustainable
Fisheries Act amendments, introducing new National Standard 9
with oblique reference to the inevitable conflicts it would trigger
with other management goals. Acknowledging that it would be difficult to fully eliminate bycatch in a commercially viable fishery, the
Committee explained that:
The issue of bycatch reduction and the reduction of discard mortality have been identified by the Committee as one
of the most important challenges facing fisheries managers
today. There has been a dramatic reduction in population
levels of stocks of fish worldwide. One identifiable cause in
the U.S. fisheries has been bycatch and the needless waste

57. Because the regional councils are predominantly composed of industry participants,
some argue that Congress didn’t even truly punt the values conflict to the agency—it handed
the conflict directly to the industry. See, e.g., EAGLE, NEWKIRK & THOMPSON, supra note 30.
58. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(7) (2012).
59. Id. § 1851(9).
60. See, e.g., Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Oceana,
Inc. v. Evans, 384 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2005).
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of commercially harvestable fish and the disposal of juvenile
and other fish.
The Committee intends that reduction of bycatch should
be a goal of all Fishery Management Plans. It is unlikely,
however, that any fishery—recreational or commercial—can
occur without some bycatch being taken. The amendment
contained in this section thus requires that bycatch be minimized to the maximum extent practicable, not eliminated.
While the Committee recognizes that it will be very difficult
to eliminate all bycatch, it is clear that Councils and fishermen should continually look for innovative ways to make
significant reductions in bycatch and in the mortality of
discards.61
Yet the issue goes beyond conflicts between conservation and
economic interests; questions about how to balance interests arise
even from within the extraction community—allocating catch
among commercial, recreational, and subsistence fishers.62
Like many legal rules that create balancing tests, the National
Standards are like a big delicious salad bowl of conflicting values.
In the analogous context of property law, they are like the three
factors of the regulatory takings balancing test, which have been
critiqued as unmanageable because they represent incommensurate
factors that can point in completely different directions.63 They are
like the five good governance values underlying constitutional
federalism, which I have described in previous work.64 Except here,
the problem is compounded because there are ten separate factors,
setting the stage for even more potential conflicts!
Of course, the ten National Standards are not all in conflict, and
many can be incorporated harmoniously much of the time. But there
is the potential for conflict, and because a stakeholder can always
argue that one standard is getting short shrift, these potential conflicts become fodder for potential litigation. Even so, it is very hard
to prove which one should take priority as a matter of law—which

61. H.R. REP. NO. 104-171 at 27 (1995).
62. See Ray Hilborn, Defining Success in Fisheries and Conflicts in Objectives, 31
MARINE POL’Y 153 (2007) (discussing fairness and equity in issuing catch limit rules); see also
Van Valin v. Locke, 671 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009).
63. For an overview of the “veritable cottage industry [that] has developed among
scholars and commentators, who regularly attempt to invest the decision’s gauzy rhetoric
with meaning[,]” see R.S. Radford & Luke A. Wake, Deciphering and Extrapolating: Searching
for Sense in Penn Central, 38 ECOL. L.Q. 731, 732 (2011).
64. See RYAN, TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 33, at 34–67 (2012) (discussing checks
and balances, transparency and accountability, localism values, and the problem-solving
value implied by subsidiarity); Ryan, Environmental Federalism, supra note 36, at 362–64
(adding explicit consideration of how centralized power counterbalances localism values).
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means that it is also very hard to win this kind of litigation.65 Craig
and Danley’s work confirms this point, showing that the agency prevails against challenges from the conservation and industry sides
well over half the time, and as much as 75 percent of the time when
the suit is brought by the fishing community.66
IV. WHY DOES INDUSTRY BRING LITIGATION MORE
OFTEN THAN ENVIRONMENTALISTS?
This last observation leads naturally to our third and final
question: if they lose almost 75 percent of the time, why is it that
members of the fishing industry sue more often than conservation
interests? This is actually a surprising point, as one might reasonably expect the opposite. After all, the FCMA has often been criticized
by those observing that conservation interests are the only stakeholders in the fisheries context that do not get a guaranteed vote on
the regional fishery management councils.67 Why would fishers sue
more often than conservationists, when they are guaranteed voting
representation in the process of fishery management planning, and
conservationists are not?
Indeed, the regional councils are primarily composed of fishing
interests. The statute mandates that each council include the
principal state official with responsibility for marine fisheries
management responsibility of each regional state, and the regional
director of the National Marine Fisheries Service for the relevant
geographic area, but it leaves the rest of membership appointment
decisions to the agency, in consultation with the relevant state
governors.68 And while the statute explicitly requires balance on the
councils between commercial and recreational fishing interests,

65. Craig & Danley, supra note 1, at 411.
66. Id.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)–(c) (2012) (setting out requirements of members, appointed by
U.S. Secretary of Commerce, of Regional Fishery Management Councils under FCMA and
distinguishing between voting and nonvoting members thereof). For an example of criticism
thereof, see Thomas E. Okey, Membership of the Eight Regional Fishery Management Councils
in the United States: Are Special Interests Over-Represented?, 27 MARINE POL’Y 193 (2003).
For a survey of litigation over catch shares, see Suzanne Iudicello & Sherry Bosse Lueders,
A Survey of Litigation over Catch Shares and Groundfish Management in the Pacific Coast
and Northeast Multispecies Fisheries, 46 ENVTL. L. 157 (2016).
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)–(c) (2012).
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there is no equivalent balance mandated balance between extraction and conservation interests.69 The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
gets a member on each council, but only in a non-voting capacity.70
This means that conservation interests are not guaranteed the
same access to management decision-making that fishing industry
members get—so you might reasonably assume that they would be
more likely to end up unhappy with the results of that process, and
to sue when they find themselves unhappy. Yet according to Craig
and Danley’s data, that has not been happening.71 Why so?
While I can only speculate here, the answer may be surprisingly
straightforward. Public choice theory, an economic model of political
behavior, might account for the unexpectedly low ratio of environmentalist to fisher lawsuits. In fact, fishery governance and litigation may provide a classic example of the dynamics predicted by
public choice theory.72
A. Public Choice Theory and Fishing Litigation.
Public choice theory predicts that stakeholders with concentrated interests in a certain result will invest more in obtaining that
result than will the diffuse members of a larger group who would
prefer otherwise. Even though the aggregate interests of the larger
group may outweigh that of the concentrated stakeholders, the
members of the larger group experience their interests only as
disaggregated individuals, none of whom cares enough on their own
to out-lobby the concentrated interest group.73 As a result, the public
choice model predicts that concentrated “special interests,” or
69. The statute details:
The Secretary, in making appointments under this section, shall, to the extent
practicable, ensure a fair and balanced apportionment, on a rotating or other basis,
of the active participants (or their representatives) in the commercial and recreational fisheries under the jurisdiction of the Council. On January 31, 1991, and
each year thereafter, the Secretary shall submit to the Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation of the Senate and the Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries of the House of Representatives a report on the actions taken by the
Secretary to ensure that such fair and balanced apportionment is achieved.
Id. § 1852(b)(2)(B)
70. Id. § 1852(C)(1)(a).
71. Craig & Danley, supra note 1, at 411–18.
72. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A
Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553 (2001). For discussions of public choice theory
in the context of environmental policy, see William W. Buzbee, Clean Air Act Dynamism
and Disappointments: Lessons for Climate Change Legislation to Prompt Innovation and
Discourage Inertia, 32 WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 33 (2010); see also William W. Buzbee, Interactions’ Promise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons,
57 EMORY L.J. 145 (2007).
73. Id.
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single-issue voters, will always outmaneuver the general public
in the political process that will determine the ultimate policy
outcome.74
In the fisheries context, fishers are likely to be singleissue stakeholders. As a group, their interests coalesce around one
primary goal: staying in business on their local fisheries, and being
able to continue fishing for the single or select group of fish that
creates their livelihood. There may be equivalent single-issue
conservation groups that also care only about one or two species
of fish in an individual fishery, but most non-governmental organizations with an interest in fisheries management have a wider repertoire of concerns, over a broader geographic area, and perhaps
including other wildlife—or other ocean or waterway issues, or even
wider environmental issues that have nothing to do with fisheries
or waterways.75 On balance, they are probably less likely to invest
in fighting an individual FMP than a fisher whose entire livelihood
hinges on the rules in that management plan.
Moreover, as noted in Part III, suing over the content of FMPs
is a highly uncertain endeavor, because the National Standards
confer so much agency discretion that reviewing courts are hardpressed to find fault with the substantive content of all but the most
egregious management decisions.76 Yet it is this very same fact
may reveal why fishers are still going to court, and by and large,
conservationists are not.
All else being equal, single-issue actors may be more likely to
sue under conditions of deep uncertainty about the result of their
litigation, because they have everything to gain from litigating a
management decision they do not like, and everything to lose if they
do not. With everything at stake, they are more likely to leave it all
on the field in their effort to undo an undesirable FMP. By contrast,
conservationists with more varied agendas may think hard about
whether they have a chance of winning before they invest scarce
resources in litigating a FMP. If you have scarce resources and

74. Id.
75. For example, the Sea Turtle Conservancy, headquartered in Florida, is devoted
to the conservation of sea turtles. See About the Sea Turtle Conservancy, SEA TURTLE
CONSERVANCY, https://conserveturtles.org/sea-turtle-conservancy/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2017).
However, the organization focuses on sea turtle preservation in the Atlantic, Pacific, and
Caribbean oceans and addresses various threats to turtles, ranging from fishing impacts to
habitat loss and beach-front lighting. Id. These factors diffuse the interests of the Sea Turtle
Conservancy in any one fishery management plan decision, at least relative to the interests
of the local fishers who will be singularly and directly affected by that decision.
76. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. But see Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 753 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting the agency’s promulgation of a FMP on
Chevron Step 2, for unreasonably interpreting the ambiguity Congress left it in failing to
provide for significant conservation measures in a summer flounder fishing quota).
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multiple objectives, you’re going to think very carefully about
whether it’s even worth getting into such an uncertain game.77
Notably, this hypothesis draws some support from Craig and
Danley’s data, which suggest that even though environmentalist
sue less often, they win a bit more when they do litigate.78 It may
be that environmentalists make more careful decisions about when
to sue, investing scarce resources only in those lawsuits they believe
they can win. Further support is provided by Craig and Danley’s
findings that litigation by conservationists increased after the
enactment of the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act.79 The 1996
Sustainable Fisheries Act amendments put a heavier thumb on
the scale towards conservation priorities within the conflicting
National Standards, giving conservationists a reason to think that
they could sue more successfully—and they did.
V. CONCLUSION: FISHERIES AND OUR DYNAMIC
SEPARATION OF POWERS
While these comments yield no groundbreaking conclusions, I
offer some closing thoughts, generally affirming the administrative
structure of fisheries governance, flawed though it remains, as the
best of the available alternatives—at least in this Panglossian, bestof-all-possible political contexts.80 The FCMA has yet to succeed
at its task, as too many U.S. fisheries remain overfished and overcapitalized, with too much bycatch and damage to marine habitats.81 Scholarly recommendations for improving fisheries management include ambitious proposals for adapting urban planning
models to zone the ocean for different uses, reducing the influence
of industry-dominated regional councils and diffusing decisionmaking authority through a variety of different agency actors, with
differing degrees of legislative constraints.82 These proposals

77. Comparatively scare resources limit the likelihood that conservationists will bring
litigation for additional reasons. As one former conservation lobbyist explains, “In order to
develop the understanding of issues in a particular fishery, you must send a person to most
council meetings, go to panel and subcommittee meetings (which are spread around the entire
council region), read all of the stock assessments in consultation with a fisheries scientist, etc.
I was paid to do this for Audubon, and I could only monitor one or two fisheries. While
[conservationists] probably monitor most major fisheries this way today, the industry
monitors every single one.” Josh Eagle, email correspondence of April 21, 2017 (on file with
author).
78. Craig & Danley, supra note 1, at 415–18.
79. Id.
80. VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE (1759) (in which Professor Pangloss concludes that because
ours is the only possible world, thus it must be “the best of all possible worlds,” no matter how
deeply flawed it may be).
81. See, e.g., Eagle, Sanchirico & Thompson, Ocean Zoning, supra note 4, at 648–49.
82. Id.
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warrant our consideration as we continue to improve our stewardship of fishery resources and the ecosystems of which they are
part. Nevertheless, even under the existing FCMA model, steady
improvements in fisheries management over time demonstrates the
vitality of our horizontal and vertical separation of powers—even
in a context as heavily administrative as this one.
For the purposes that the FCMA sets out to achieve, the
administrative state outperforms the other branches in most
contexts. The FCMA delegates to administrative actors the very
tasks we need an administrative state to be able to accomplish—
quick responses in an ongoing process of highly technical, datadriven, fluid, consultative, and adaptive decision-making. Fisheries
management provides a good example of the complex decisions that
must be made on the basis of scientific evidence—but in the face
of incommensurable values conflicts whose resolution is not immediately obvious, and may differ from one context to another. These
are the kinds of decisions that are best reached through ongoing
processes of negotiation among locally diverse stakeholders, and
thus suited for administrative process.83
Of course, this process hinges on adequate representation of
all stakeholders, and conservationists have long argued that their
limited access to the regulatory process has been a fatal flaw for
balanced management choices, based on a statutory design flaw in
the make-up of the regional councils. Later FCMA amendments
have enhanced the voice of conservationists at the table by including
new conservation directives among statutory requirements, but
without voting roles on the regional councils, their representatives
continue to feel excluded from core management decisions.84 In a
separate account of negotiated governance in the face of incommensurable values conflicts, I highlighted the importance of faithful and
adequate representation as one of three key principles needed to
confer legitimacy on a consensus-based outcome,85 a lesson that
could be better heeded in the FCMA context.
As configured under the FCMA, management activity is subject
to judicial intervention when litigants challenge the agency’s
resolution of core policy conflicts that have been deferred to it by
the legislature. Accordingly, we see proportionately more litigation
about the content of the fishery management plans than any
83. See generally Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, supra note 37.
84. Josh Eagle, email correspondence of April 21, 2017 (on file with author) (“Environmental groups attend council meetings, but the only reason councils ever listen to them
is because they are afraid of being sued. I went to dozens of council meetings as an environmental lobbyist and I can say with absolute certainty that I was never part of the drafting
process.”)
85. See RYAN, TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 33, at 342–47; Ryan, Negotiating
Federalism, supra note 37, at 108–09.
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other feature—and most often brought by members of the fishing
industry, the single-issue stakeholders who are motivated to sue
whenever their interests are threatened by agency choices. Yet the
deference the statute confers on the process also means that most
litigation is unsuccessful, because the courts defer to reasonable
agency decision-making under the ordinary principles of administrative law.86 When the values conflict commands no nationally
uniform consensus, and the agency has come to a legitimate
conclusion on the basis of a diligent consultative process with all
relevant stakeholders, then the court appropriately defers because
the administrative process itself becomes the best and perhaps
only means of prioritizing incommensurable values in individual
contexts.87 (Once again, however, a legitimate conclusion can only
be negotiated among all relevant stakeholders.88)
Even so, Congress should never give a blank-check for executive
hegemony, and when FMPs were failing the primary goal of fishery
management—to sustainably shepherd the resource—Congress
appropriately amended the statute, disrupting the status quo of
administrative fisheries management. In the 1996 Sustainable
Fisheries Act amendments, Congress added new National Standards that, on balance, redirected agency decision-making toward
conservationist goals. The amendments also provided a new hook
for judicial review, presenting the courts with crisp new statutory
mandates for interpretation and altering the public choice factors
that had previously induced litigation primarily to expand fishing
rights.
The new standards encouraged conservation interests to invoke
judicial oversight more often, with more reason to believe that
their litigation would succeed. By articulating new standards that
empowered conservation-side litigation, Congress may even have
created the opportunity for public participation by the statutorily
disfavored conservation stakeholders. The increased threat of litigation from conservationists likely induced regional management
councils to better heed their concerns in FMP design, even though
the statute does not guarantee them a vote.89 The MagnusonStevens Reauthorization Act of 2006 further bolstered conservation
interests, amending the Act to direct that the United States advance
international fisheries management efforts toward greater marine

86. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
87. C.f. RYAN, TUG OF WAR WITHIN, supra note 33, at 347–56; Ryan, Negotiating
Federalism, supra note 37, at 110–120 (discussing the significance of procedural constraints
when substantive constraints are unable to resolve incommensurable values conflicts).
88. Id. (discussing the importance of stakeholder representation).
89. See supra note 84.
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resource protection.90 And so the dialectic of inter-branch power
dynamics continues apace in fisheries management.
Indeed, the history of the FCMA and its amendments shows that
the balance of horizontal power in our constitutional system is never
fixed, even in a regulatory context as heavily administrative as
fisheries management. Congress can always intervene to constrain
agency discretion, and to empower judicial oversight against agency
expertise, by providing more clearly defined statutory guidance.
This is precisely what Congress did when it enacted the 1996 and
2006 amendments—constituting additional iterations in the familiar pattern of engagement among branches of government, alternating between moments in which they compete for power and others
in which they yield.
In this way, the FCMA, the Sustainable Fisheries Act, the
Reauthorization Act, and their impacts on fishing litigation showcase the effective deployment of our constitutional structure to
horizontally reallocate management authority across the three
branches in response to a new policy consensus—here, the need
for stricter fishery conservation. These successive moments in regulatory history highlight the possibility for ongoing renegotiation
of regulatory authority among the branches of government, and it
demonstrates that entrusting fisheries to the administrative state—
or indeed, entrusting it with any substantive realm of governance—
is never the end of the line. Even fishery governance retains the
vitality characteristic of our dynamic system of horizontally and
vertically separated powers.91
As crazy as that system can look from the outside, I conclude
with the overall assessment that the balance of legislative, judicial,
and administrative power in fisheries management is (at least
roughly) as it should be. Congress could certainly improve the
FCMA—at a minimum, correcting the balance of representation on
the regional councils, or perhaps even diffusing council authority
with other forms of agency oversight in differently purposed marine
areas92—but as a model for fishery management, it rightly sets forth
overarching policy goals and confers agency discretion to realize
them in individual contexts. Most day-to-day decisions are not
suited for the interpretive distinctions that courts draw, or the
broadly sweeping rules that legislators can provide. Only the
agencies possess the necessary governing capacity—the time,
90. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of
2006, Pub. L. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007).
91. Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism and the Structural Constitution: Navigating the
Separation of Powers both Vertically and Horizontally (A Response to Aziz Huq), 115 COLUM.
L. R. SIDEBAR 4 (2015).
92. See Eagle, Sanchirico & Thompson, Ocean Zoning, supra note 4.
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expertise, and regulatory flexibility—to work out the details of
fishery management on a day to day basis.
Fisheries management thus reveals the importance of the
administrative state, working together with its co-equal branches,
in moving us toward meaningful regulatory solutions. It is not
exactly environmental law without courts, nor should it be—but a
healthy dialectic should allow executive branch decision-making to
lead in contexts where the best governance is negotiated among
scientists, stakeholders, and citizens through the administrative
process. So long as all stakeholders, including the public, are
adequately represented, and so long as Congress and the courts
remain a meaningful check against egregious choices, procedural
abuses, and evolving policy consensus, then much of the governance
capacity required by the task is best provided by the administrative
state.
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